COMPREENDER KANT GEORGES PASCAL PDF

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The article has the Kantian aesthetics as subject and proposes a study of reflecting judgment and its relation to critical hermeneutic ethics, having as main objective to investigate the critical hermeneutic ethics and its possibility to offer epistemological basis for the Law in contemporaneity.

It was identified that it is possible to extend the reflecting judgment to the aesthetical field, even though the reflecting judgment is neither constitutive nor normative, once it contains a guiding function connected to the conformity principle to ends that serve as orientation for the cases evidenced in law area. In what concerns to rationalist philosophy, this article mobilizes the reflecting judgment as a condition for a hermeneutics that lay its roots on the critique of judgment, allowing articulations that are organized from a research-orienting question: at what measure can a hermeneutical ethics offer an epistemological guidance for Law in contemporaneity?

The present study is delimitated as follows: [i] in one, from a philosophical approach unified by the Kantian critical system able to identify the preconditions for an epistemology that enables the achievement of judgments and [ii] in two, in the interception of understanding and practical reason from the postulates of aesthetic judgment, in particular, the reflecting judgment and [iii] in three, in the investigation about the possibilities of a critical ethics hermeneutic serve as epistemological guidance for the Law.

In summary, the given discussion involves determinant judgment and reflecting judgment, being the first as the difference allowing the delimitation of the second, and yet, by the reason of dissimilarities, both serve as auxiliary lines to clarify the problem in all its extension and complexity. In this line, the reflecting judgment analysis and the route to the construction of a hermeneutical ethics must allow the identification of a new posture as per the problems faced by Law, from the epistemological orientation that will possibly be revealed by the survey.

Yet in the initial part of this work, Kant says that even considering the passing from the realm of nature to the realm of freedom as impossible, the concept of freedom shall perpetrate in the sensible world the end imposed by its laws, or in other words, the sensible world must be conform to the purposes of freedom laws, under penalty of incongruence with the laws of freedom and make impossible the comprehension of the moral in the world.

There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains; and the concept of this ground, although it does not attain either theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the same, and hence has no peculiar realm, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other.

KU, XX. It appears that by pointing out the impossibility of the concept of a foundation of the supersensible unity coming to achieve a knowledge seems to indicate, in a preliminary judgment, that Kant establishes the possibility of a bridge between nature and freedom as a type of belief 2. In the family of the higher cognitive faculties there is a middle term between the Understanding and the Reason. This is the Judgment, of which we have cause for supposing according to analogy that it may contain in itself, if not a special legislation, yet a special principle of its own to be sought according to laws, though merely subjective a priori.

So, with the faculty of judging - Usteilskraft - the middle point starts to be established and a bridge can built between nature sensible and liberty supersensible. However, the following questions remains: which judgment would this be? Is it demonstrable? What Is its epistemological status? Is there a relation between it and hermeneutics or between it and moral? At the moment, it is imperative to study a little more the differences between the determining judgments and the reflecting judgments.

The first treaties relatively to critics and pure reason were carried out from the application of universal concepts to particular situations; the second ones, judgments generated from external contingencies looking for a unity around the concept 5. Not as if, in this way, such an Understanding must be assumed as actual for it is only our reflective Judgement to which this Idea serves as a principle-for reflecting, not for determining ; but this faculty thus gives a law only to itself and not to nature.

As seen, the reflecting judgment needs an intelligence in nature that contains purposes, found in an exercise mental experiment that aims to justify the reflection that permits the unification of these universes. The faculty of imagination - evoked in Kantian construction - allows the inception of an idea 6 of finality for the innerness of the judgment, constituting a regulator principle, closing casualness and finality with the purpose of harmonizing as the laws of nature and freedom.

With this, there is a relation between imagination, understanding and sensibility 7 in the Discovery heuristics of the principal of conformity for ends that serve as a middle term between natural casualness and moral finality, and, as investigated since Kant, an hermeneutics from aesthetics has and it is what id defended an epistemological and moral casing.

Hence, as if it were a lucky chance favouring our design, we are rejoiced properly speaking, relieved of a want , if we meet with such systematic unity under merely empirical laws; although we must necessarily assume that there is such a unity without our comprehending it or being able to prove it. In case the theme of reflective judgment is the beginning of the ending line, from the observation of nature and the organization of a living being takes Kant to state that "an organized product of nature is one where everything is order and vice versa middle.

So, even though the principle of finality can be deducted from the experience of observation, nourished by a transcendentalism in face of a universality and necessity bore by the principle, as says Kant:. With this, Kant undoes any tensioning between determinism and the principle of conformity to ends, once the finality is a regulator principle and not an understanding constituent principle , escaping from a relation of antinomy that could apparently involve the principles.

Yet, it could be inferable that a reflecting judgment thinks to itself a regulator principle and - for being a judgment - it must be in some determinant moment, even though it only exerts a subsumption 8 by concepts found in the reflection 9 itself.

Therefore, it is licit to conclude that the reflecting judgment has now by principle the power to reflect from the sensibility to the production of concepts not given a priori, constituting itself in a strategy for thinking concepts that are born from the empiric and, by force of the faculty of imagination, operating under the aegis of reflection, starts to constitute the conceptual universe that allows the judgment.

This principle of conformity to end is born from the delight that the sensation of the external generates between the imagination and the understanding without the conceptual mediation, constituting itself in a direct relation with the pure reason from where ex surge a transcendental and unifying principle of the Kantian critical system involving the pre-conceptual field not yet considered by the two other critics.

Having been demonstrated that the sensibility can unify the faculty of the understanding pure reason and conformity to ends likewise? We no longer find, it is true, any marked pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and in the unity of its divisions into genera and species, whereby are possible all empirical concepts, through which we recognize it according to its particular laws.

However, this pleasure has certainly been present at one time, and it is only because the commonest experience would be impossible without it that it is gradually confounded with mere cognition and no longer arrests particular attention. KU, XL. At this measure it becomes trivialized and bureaucratic and stops being creative.

As, on the contrary, it wants to keep its creativity, what involves a relation between the theory and the delight of knowing, at this measure we will be able to say that the theory is no longer grayish. And the knowledge, thought in the critics of pure reason compared to a tree, will then recognize itself as the golden tree of knowledge.

Coniil Sancho names different contemporaneous authors who deal with hermeneutics under its diverse perspectives Rawls, Taylor, Gadamer , Apel, Habermas , among others, bringing up a feeling of strangeness that such authors, even though dealing with moral philosophy and politics, do not engage in a particularized study of an hermeneutical ethics.

Within this context, the question that orients this research rises: is the existence of an authentic hermeneutical critical ethics that attends both irrevocable sides, logos and experience possible? Drawing a parallel between the first critique [ Once the third critique brings a reflecting capacity of judging, an orienting and interpretative function is obtained, moving away from a legislative function, which appears in the first and in the second critique.

Conill Sancho highlights that even though the reflecting judgment is more free and allows that imagination creates its own ideas to organize the experience - there are not many works extending the Kantian theory of the critique of the judgment in addition to the problems of taste 15 and its finality in nature he cites as instance, Hanna Arendt, on footnote 4, mentioning her work where the conditions of the reflecting judgment is applied on the analysis of the political judgment.

To defend the thesis of hermeneutics from the third critique CJ , Conill Sancho cites that in the sublime feeling the imagination changes from apprehension to an aesthetic understanding, instantly capturing the multiplicity as a unit, given that the holistic approach points to a transcendental philosophy enabling a more integral view of man.

To Conill, the aesthetic in Kant's system is not in a secondary place, bringing hermeneutical function of mediation between understanding and reason, resulting in orientation: according to the philosopher, nor deduction neither induction, but an interpretive understanding that is based on a harmonious movement of faculties.

Conill Sancho will also identify that the feeling of life - morally interpreted - could be considered the aesthetic manifestation of transcendental freedom, presenting as associated the feeling of respect as an aesthetic manifestation of rational consciousness of the moral law. From this perspective, one can reflect on the continuity of relationship between Kant and Dilthey, as for Conill Sancho Kant's work already announces an incipient philosophy of life, once he believed that life could only be felt but could not be known.

Kant and Dilthey agree that life is primarily accessible through feeling and Conill Sancho concludes that [ i ] the usage of the Kantian concept of life in the Critique of Judgment demonstrates the continuity on the work Critique of historical reason by Dilthey and [ ii ] the philosophy of life in Dilthey seeks historical self-reflection selbstbesinnung , it should be considered as an enlargement of the principle of Kantian 16 reflective judgment.

Conill drags the temporality of the being to the temporality of reason, joining being, logos, sense of life, allowing then an hermeneutic universalism to be postulated.

A hermeneutical critic ethics as Conill Sancho intends is a project that, even though seeking its fundaments in the Kantian criticism, advances and rebuilds from a radical fresh start from Kant. If the proposed new beginning is sufficiently authorized by the continent philosopher, it is a discussion that overflows the narrow limits of this research.

The question is redefined at the end: after all, is it possible to extend the reflective judgment to the field of ethics and law? Considering the available evidence, it is about directing an aesthetic system to a cognitive system, where the game among reason, understanding and sensitivity is redefined, being the last one mentioned as a mediator of the process of understanding. At last, to conduct a pragmatic study of the application would also be beyond the limits proposed by the theme, and that internalization of the hermeneutical model, alone, has a pragmatic reach for [i] represent a new relationship with the externality and [ii] always involves the interpreter behavioral change leaving evident in cases where there is an enclosure in a positivist model.

The determinant judgments were the object of the Critique of Pure Reason and its accomplishment from the application of universal concepts to specific situations; the reflecting judgments Critique of Judgment come from the conclusion that in nature there is a large number of laws that are not determined a priori, and such external contingencies seek unity in the concept that needs to be found.

Finality is a regulative principle corollary of the reflective judgment if it is not a constitutive principle of understanding , escaping from a relation of antinomy that would apparently involve the principles purpose and causality.

The aesthetic reflection is at the basis of hermeneutics both in Dilthey as in Gadamer, represent a break with the domination of the concept, accordingly, serves to question the instituted and to serve as a guide to the unveiling of the sense. Taking into account that the decisions in law invariably involve a judgment with creative power that enables weighting from the externality not yet normatively set , the reflective judgment can serve as epistemological orientation for the studies of cases.

The reflective judgment as an instrument at the service of critical hermeneutics ethics allows the multiple given the experience to climb internalization and condense from the vivification: reflected concepts that feed back into these practices arise.

This process tends to infinity and is only possible [i] by the inherent purpose of the judgment and [ii] the ethical link that generates "weak normativity" that externalizes as guidance thread.

This is the meaning of a critical-hermeneutical ethics: to know that there is an ethics defining the outlines, designing senses and ensure objectivity to the judgments stated before the events of the world. With that, submitted to the outlines of facticity and historicity, more and more human and social sciences need to dialogue with the processes born from complex reality and be able to produce appropriate responses, enabling the inference that the construction of meanings is becoming more dependent on the reflection and its levels as well as on ethical foundations that need to integrate the hermeneutical process.

Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, HAMM, Christian. Santa Maria: Ed. KANT, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Translated with Introduction and notes by J. Macmillan Company, London, Campinas, SP: Editora da Unicamp, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: the hermeneutical importo of the Critique of Judgment.

Chicago: Chicago Press, Compreender Kant 7. Seis estudos de psicologia. Kriterion, Belo Horizonte, v. Acesso em: 27 nov. On the idiom of Truth and the Movement of Life. Schwerpunkt: 50, Jahre Wahrheit und Methode. Mohr Siebeck, Oxford: Blackwell, Intelligence rationality is the ability of a subject for which he has the power to represent what, by virtue of its quality, cannot fall his senses.

The sensibility of the subject is sensitive; which, however, contains nothing but what is knowable by intelligence is intelligible. On this topic, the considerations are general and consider the entirety of the work. Makreel, , p. Piaget, , p. E-mail: garcia garcias. E-mail: vpbarreto terra. Luiz Rohden. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. Services on Demand Journal. Abstract The article has the Kantian aesthetics as subject and proposes a study of reflecting judgment and its relation to critical hermeneutic ethics, having as main objective to investigate the critical hermeneutic ethics and its possibility to offer epistemological basis for the Law in contemporaneity.

KU, XX It appears that by pointing out the impossibility of the concept of a foundation of the supersensible unity coming to achieve a knowledge seems to indicate, in a preliminary judgment, that Kant establishes the possibility of a bridge between nature and freedom as a type of belief 2.

KU, XXII So, with the faculty of judging - Usteilskraft - the middle point starts to be established and a bridge can built between nature sensible and liberty supersensible. KU, XXVIII As seen, the reflecting judgment needs an intelligence in nature that contains purposes, found in an exercise mental experiment that aims to justify the reflection that permits the unification of these universes.

KU, XXXIV In case the theme of reflective judgment is the beginning of the ending line, from the observation of nature and the organization of a living being takes Kant to state that "an organized product of nature is one where everything is order and vice versa middle.

So, even though the principle of finality can be deducted from the experience of observation, nourished by a transcendentalism in face of a universality and necessity bore by the principle, as says Kant: […] is not a principle for the determinant but only for the reflective Judgement; that it is regulative and not constitutive; and that we derive from it a clue by which we consider natural things in reference to an already given ground of determination according to a new law-abiding order; and extend our natural science according to a different principle, viz.

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